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Abstract: Truth-telling behavior in university students (n=38) was examined using a 
simple stylized poker experiment.  Four treatments were applied that changed either card 
probabilities or payoff structure.  Results indicated that in some cases the students’ 
behavior conformed closely to theoretical predictions.  However, other cases indicated 
robust inconsistencies between observed behavior and mixed-strategy Nash predictions.  
These findings suggest that there is a strong relationship between the propensity to tell 
the truth and the costs and rewards thereof. A link between calling behavior and costs and 
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There are many good reasons to study lying and deception among children.  
Everyday, parents are put into situations that involve trusting their children.  When a 
child wants to go play outside with the neighborhood kids, a frequent pre-requisite is to 
insure that they have finished with their household responsibilities such as brushing their 
teeth, making their beds, cleaning their rooms and so forth. 
While it could be argued that the above reasons are somewhat trivial, there are 
more pressing issues that involve a child’s trust such as court testimony.  With a 
substantial and increasing number of young children testifying in North American courts, 
researchers are inquiring about the accuracy of their testimonies.  Children’s truthfulness 
and their understanding of its benefits and consequences of lying are critical for ensuring 
the viability and value of their testimony.  Within the last two decades, extensive 
theoretical research has been done on children’s conceptual understanding of lie-telling 
and truth-telling, however, very little empirical evidence exists which addresses a child’s 
willingness and ability to make risky decisions based on bluffing and truth-telling in a 
legal and economic framework.  Additionally, little is known about how factors such as 
payoffs and detection probabilities influence children’s propensity to tell the truth.  It is 
that deficit that has inspired my research endeavors.  
In this paper I report on the laboratory results of a study that uses a simplified 
version of poker to examine the strategic behavior of college students, their propensity to 
bluff and tell the truth and to what extent their behavior is consistent with game 
theoretical predictions.  The ultimate goal of this project is to extend it to younger 
children between the ages of ten and thirteen.  However, the subjects that I report on are 
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only a few years past the age of legal majority (the age at which one acquires full legal 
rights of an adult).1
The game of poker is a simple, stylized representation of some important 
elements of truth telling and I adapt a version of poker created by Reiley, Urbancic, and 
Walker (2005) that strips the conventional game of poker to its fundamentals.  First, there 
are information asymmetries where one player has complete information about his card 
and the other player’s card, but the other player only knows his own card.  Like a child 
who knows whether or not they have made their bed but their parent hasn’t a clue.  
Second, the game allows for opportunities to bluff and either get away with it, or get 
called by the other player.  Similarly, a child who hasn’t made their bed may report 
otherwise and can get a way with it if their parent trusts them, or can get called if their 
parent checks their room.  For these reasons stated above, I feel that poker is a plausible 
representation of some significant elements of truth telling.  However, it is also true that 
not all aspects of truth-telling are captured by this experiment, such as the moral 
implications of lie-telling. 
For this game, two students are paired anonymously and assigned the role of 
player 1 or player 2.  There are three possible cards- A, B, or C- in which A > B > C. 
Player 1 knows not only his own card, but also the card of player 2.  Player 2 only knows 
his own card and hence has less information than player 1.  After observing his card, 
player 1 then moves first by either betting or folding.  If he folds, then the game is over.  
If he bets, then player 2 can either call or fold.  A successful bluff requires two things. 
Player 1 must bet with card C and player 2 must fold.   
                                                 
1 The age of legal majority varies state by state in the U.S.  Most states give full rights by the age of twenty-
one.  The age of students who participated ranged from 19-55, though only a few outlier students were 
above the age of 23. 
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The experiment was conducted on a total of 38 university students ranging from 
sophomore to senior status.  Four different treatments were applied.  Almost all of the 
students acted strategically by mixing between two strategies:  That of betting all the time 
regardless of their card (Bluffing), and folding when given the weak card (Truth-telling).  
I found the students were not behaving consistent with game theoretical predictions 
during some treatments, but their behavior conformed remarkably closely to theoretical 
predictions under other treatments. There were instances where the students were playing 
close to their optimal strategies given what the other player was doing. Interestingly, the 
students significantly, albeit not perfectly, adjusted their behavior in a direction 
consistent with theory.  For example, the third treatment gave a high probability to 
receiving the losing card, making the optimal strategy to bluff very little of the time.  
That said, the students bluffed significantly less under treatment 3 than the treatment 1, 
where the odds of getting both the winning and losing card were equal.  
 I conclude that college students are not the best poker players.  In most cases, they 
were bluffing either too much when in principle they should have been bluffing less, and 
bluffing too little when in principle they should have been bluffing more.  However, their 
choices showed a clear understanding that some level of bluffing is optimal and they 
knew when to change their propensities to tell the truth given changes in the game.  For 
example, when the costs of bluffing were increased, students responded by truth-telling 
significantly more and almost exactly equal to the optimal amount. These results are quite 
provocative for they suggest to some degree that incentives and consequences change the 
propensity to tell the truth.   
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 This paper begins with a brief literature review, largely from psychology, that 
reports on the surrounding issues of adolescent testimony, surveys previous studies that 
examined the age at children develop the capacity to engage in deceitful behavior and 
their understanding of the morality of truth and lie-telling.  This is followed by a 
description of the poker game created by Reiley et al and a walkthrough of the process of 
determining the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of the four different treatments used in 
this study. Results are then presented comparing observed behavior with theoretical 
predictions followed by a conclusion with suggested policy considerations. 
  
2.  Literature Review  
By the 1980’s, society’s sensitivity to and reaction from problems such as abuse 
and violence suffered by children had changed, and as a result, states revised their 
criminal procedures to deal more effectively with adolescent victims and defendants 
(Bruck, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1998).  This led to important changes in the legal system 
not only in the United States but also in other countries in the Western world (Davies, 
Lloyd-Bostock, McMurran, & Wilson, 1995).  Relaxations of standards that had 
prevented many children from testifying were perhaps the most important among these 
changes (Bruck, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1998).    
  Children are now increasingly being called to the witness stand to testify for 
various reasons including alleged child abuse and other serious transgressions committed 
by their parents or other adults (Bala, Lee, Lindsay, Talwar, 2000).  Because of this 
increase, researchers have been looking for ways to determine the age a child develops 
the capacity to rationally deceive others.  Both justice system professionals and forensic 
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psychologists are interested in whether or not children understand the importance of 
telling the truth and what measures if any can help facilitate more honesty among 
children (Bala, Lee, Lindsay, Talwar, 2004). 
Within the last couple of decades there has been a plethora of research on the 
conceptual understanding and moral judgments of lie-telling and truth-telling (e.g., 
Bussey, 1992, 1999; Lee, Cameron, Xu, Fu, & Board, 1997; Peterson, 1995; Peterson, 
Peterson, & Seeto, 1983; Siegal & Peterson, 1998;Wimmer, Gruber, & Perner, 1984; 
for review, see Lee, 2000).  Many of the studies on lie-telling are focused on resolving 
the theoretical debate in regards to the development of morality.  Research to date 
suggest that children’s conceptual knowledge of lie-telling and truth-telling develops as 
early as pre-school (e.g., Bussey, 1992, 1999; Peterson, 1995).   
Bussey (1999) investigated the ability of children as young as four to categorize 
three different types of intentionally false and true statements as truths and lies.  Results 
revealed that older children were better able to categorize false statements as lies and true 
statements as truths than were the four-year-olds. 
 Lewis et al (1989) looked at deception in children not quite 3 years old. The 
experimenter placed a toy behind a child and instructed the child not to peek at the toy 
when he left the room but informed the child that she could play with it at a later time.  
The experimenter left and the child remained in the room for 5 minutes if she did not 
look at the toy, or until she turned around and looked.  As soon as the child looked, the 
experimenter returned, stared at the child, and then asked the child if they peeked.  They 
found that the majority of the subjects peeked when left alone and of the subjects that 
peeked, 38 per cent told the truth and said they had looked.  Polak and Harris (1999) 
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adopted the Lewis paradigm and found similar results.  It has also been established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that children as early as 2 ½ already practice a variety of 
deceptive strategies that necessarily presuppose a working knowledge of false beliefs 
(Chandler, Fritz, and Lee 1989).   
Bala et al. (2004) took this research further by examining children’s lie-telling 
behavior to conceal a transgression not of their own, but of a parent.  Their findings 
suggest that children were sensitive to the different conditions in which they were asked 
to conceal their parent’s transgression, and responded by adjusting their lie- and truth-
telling behavior. 
 
3.  Methodology 
As mentioned before, the game of poker captures some key elements of lie- and 
truth-telling and is simple enough for kids to understand.  The bluff and fold serve as 
indicators of deception and honesty respectively and the call serves as a measure of 
detection.  Modeling these interactions is nothing new. 
Both John von Neumann (1944), the father of game theory, and French 
mathematician Émile Borel formulated models that served to illustrate the rationality of 
bluffing in poker.2 3  Both Borel’s and von Neumann’s models are comprised of risk-
neutral players and a continuum of possible hands for simplicity. 
Reiley, Urbancic, and Walker (2005) provide an even simpler model of poker, 
coined Stripped-down Poker, which I adopt with a few adjustments.4  My model 
                                                 
2 von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) 
3 Borel (1938) 
4 The majority of the content in this section and the Theory section comes from Reiley et al (2005) with the 
exception of the various treatments. I am very grateful for the foundation these authors have laid before me. 
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functions identically to the “Stripped-down” version although I change the names of the 
game, the actions, the payoff structure, and the type cards given to the players to make it 
rated PG. 
The game consists of two players with two actions. Player 1 can either bet or fold 
and player 2 can either call or fold.  Before the game can be played, each player must 
ante one dollar into the pot.  Once that is completed, player 1 and only player 1 will 
receive a randomly drawn card with either a king or queen on it.  Player 1 will privately 
observe the card, and decide whether to bet or fold.  If player 1 folds, the game ends and 
player 2 gains his ante in addition to player 1’s ante.  If player 1 bets, he must place an 
additional dollar into the pot after which player 2 decides whether to fold or call.  If 
player 2 folds, the game ends and player 1 receives his two dollars in addition to player 
1’s ante.  If player 2 calls, then he is required to add an additional dollar into the pot, and 
player 1 must show his card.  Player 1 wins the pot with the king and loses the pot with 
the queen.   At this point, the pot consists of four dollars, so the winner earns two dollars 
from the loser.   
My adapted version changes a few subtleties of the “Stripped-down” game so that 
the children are distanced from the idea that they are engaging in gambling activities.  
This is done for two reasons.  First, I would hate to think that a child’s parents would 
perceive this research to be corrupting.  Secondly, presenting the game as a poker match 
may lead to unexpected and uncontrolled variations in behavior.  For example, some 
children (boys) may be familiar with poker and be experienced bluffers in the context of 
poker. 
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My modified version uses the words quit, continue, and challenge in replace of 
fold, bet, and call respectively.  Instead of drawing a card with either a king or queen, I 
use cards with either an A or B.  Player 2 is told that he always has card C.  Card A beats 
card B, and card B beats card C. Thus card A becomes equivalent to a king and card C 
becomes equivalent to a queen.  In Stripped-down Poker, the maximum a player can end 
up losing in one game is two dollars.  We change the payoff structure so that instead of 
losing two dollars, the player would win 1.  Essentially we just add 3 points to every 
possible outcome.  In theory, this has no effect on the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.   
Initially, paper forms were used to conduct the experiment on university students.  
This method works fine, but programming the game for use with hand held computers is 
an extraordinarily more efficient way of administering the experiment for reasons that are 
nine fold.  Screen shots of the game can be found in the appendix. 
 
4. Theory 
The subsequent sections will guide you through the process of finding the optimal 
strategy or mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.  Ultimately, the mixed-strategy 
Nash equilibrium of the baseline treatment is the action set where player 1 bluffs one-
third of the time and truth tells two-thirds of the time while player 2 calls two-thirds of 
the time and folds one-third of the time.  Reiley et al (2005) provided much of the theory 
following section is based on.  I’ve added three additional treatments and provided an 
explanation of their respective mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.  
  
4.1 Extensive and Strategic Form 
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Each player moves sequentially, so the game is illustrated first in extensive form.  
Notice in figure 1 below that there are two decision nodes in player 2’s information set.  
This makes it impossible to find a solution to the game using backwards induction.   
 
Figure 1. Stripped-down poker for kids in extensive form. 
 
Thus, we naturally want to convert this game into its strategic form and look for a 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium using a game matrix.  Before we can do this, we have to find 
each player’s strategies.   
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Player 1 has four possible strategies:  
1. Continue with A and Continue with C 
2. Continue with A and Quit with C 
3. Quit with A and Continue with C 
4. Quit with A and Quit with C 
Player 2 has only two strategies: 
1. Challenge 
2. Quit 
To convert the game into strategic form using a 4x2 matrix, we must use expected 
payoffs because determining each players’ payoff from a strategy requires calculating the 
weighted average of payoffs in each state of the world.  Below is the resulting 4x2 
matrix: 
 
Table 1. Stripped-down poker for kids in strategic form. 
 
Player 2  
Challenge Quit 
CC: Continue if Card A, Continue if Card C 3,3 4,2 
CQ: Continue if Card A, Quit if Card C 3.5,2.5 3,3 





QQ: Quit if Card A, Quit if Card C 2,4 2,4 
Notice that for player 1, CC strictly dominates QC and QQ.  This suggests that regardless 
of what player 2 does, player 1 is always better off playing CC instead of QC or QQ.  





Table 2.  Dominated strategies eliminated and best responses underlined. 
 Player 2  
Challenge Quit 











Notice that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.  Naturally, this leads us to find the 
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
 
4.2 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 
We let p be the probability player 1 plays CC (Bluffing) 
We let q be the probability player 2 plays Challenge.  
 
In order for player 1 to mix up his strategies, he must be indifferent between them.  
Otherwise player 1 would always prefer one strategy, but we know that this is not 
possible because there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.  To keep both players 
indifferent, we have the following two equations: 
(1.1)  3 2.5 (1 ) 2 3 (1 ) 1/p p p p p× + × − = × + × − ⇒ = 3
(1.2)  3 4 (1 ) 3.5 3 (1 ) 2 / 3q q q q q× + × − = × + × − ⇒ =
Hence the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is: 
(1/3 CC + 2/3 CQ, 2/3 C + 1/3 Q) 
More intuitively we have: 
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(1/3 Bluff + 2/3 Truth-tell, 2/3 Call + 1/3 Fold) 
 
4.3 Treatments 
The preceding game was used as a base treatment for the experiment.  After 
playing the game with the base parameters, three slightly different treatments were 
administered that varied the card probability and payoff structure.  Incentives and costs 
were thus changed to determine whether or not behavioral changes were induced.  In 
other words, we wanted to see if changes in the subjects’ behavior were consistent with 
theoretical predictions.   Each of the three treatments have different mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibria.  The first treatment gives high odds to the good card, the second treatment 
gives high odds to the bad card, and the third treatment gives a high payoff for player 1 to 
fold, and a high payoff for player 2 to call. The subsequent paragraphs guide you through 
their respective mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. 
 
4.4 Treatment 1 
 The first treatment as mentioned above is designed to entice player 1 to bluff 
almost ninety-five percent of the time.  To make this happen without giving player 2 a 
dominated strategy, and thus the game a pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium, we must make 
the probability of getting the card A no more than seventy-four per cent.  A probability of 
seventy-five percent would in principle, make player 2 always fold, thereby giving the 
game a pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium where player 1 always bluffs and player 2 always 
folds. 
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The only difference between the base treatment and treatment 1 are the 
probabilities.  That said, below are the two equations making both players indifferent 
between their strategies: 
(2.1)  2.04 1.78 (1 ) 2 2.52 (1 ) 37/39 0.95p p p p p× + × − = × + × − ⇒ = ≈
(2.2)  3.96 4 (1 ) 4.22 3.48 (1 ) 2 / 3q q q q q× + × − = × + × − ⇒ =
Hence the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is: 
(1/3 Bluff + 2/3 Truth-tell, 2/3 Call + 1/3 Fold) 
 
4.5 Treatment 2 
 Treatment 2 is designed to entice player 1 to truth-tell more often.  By giving a 
probability of seventy-five percent to the bad card, player 1 should in theory truth-tell 
exactly eight-ninths of the time and bluff one-ninth of the time.  Like treatment 1, 
treatment 2 only differs from the base treatment in the probabilities.  This leaves us with 
the following two equations making each player indifferent: 
(3.1)  4 3.25 (1 ) 2 3.5 (1 ) 1/ 9p p p p p× + × − = × + × − ⇒ =
(3.2)  2 4 (1 ) 2.75 2.5 (1 ) 2 / 3q q q q q× + × − = × + × − ⇒ =
Hence the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is: 
(1/9 Bluff + 8/9 Truth-tell, 2/3 Call + 1/3 Fold) 
 
4.6 Treatment 3 
 The third and final treatment is designed to change the behavior of both players.  
The payoff structure is changed in two ways.  First, the payoff given to player 1 from 
folding changes from 2 to 3.5.  This can be interpreted as an increase in the opportunity 
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cost of bluffing.  Remember that player 1 bluffs with the hope that player 2 will fold, thus 
resulting in a payoff of 4 for player 1.  Since the difference in payoffs between bluffing 
successfully and truth-telling is now smaller, it seems intuitive that player 2 should 
expect player 1 to bluff less or truth-tell more.   Player 2 should in principle respond to 
this by calling less.  Second, if player 2 successfully calls a bluff, then he is given a 
payoff of 10 rather than 5.  Similarly, player 1 should respond to this by bluffing less.  
This leaves us with the following two equations making each player indifferent: 
(4.1)  5.5 2.5 (1 ) 2 3 (1 ) 1/ 8p p p p p× + × − = × + × − ⇒ =
(4.2)  3 4 (1 ) 4.25 3.75 (1 ) 1/ 6q q q q q× + × − = × + × − ⇒ =
Hence the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is: 
(1/8 Bluff + 7/8 Truth-tell, 1/6 Call + 5/6 Fold) 
 





Thirty-eight subjects (nineteen pairs) played ten rounds of the adapted version of 
Stripped-down poker.  Players were randomly matched and their respective roles (i.e. 
player one or player two) were assigned randomly.  The same role and pair assignments 
remained consistent throughout all ten rounds. Table 3 below shows the results 






Table 3. Aggregate experiment results from the base treatment. 
Player 1 given… 
 





















Payoffs 5, 1 4, 2 2, 4 1, 5 4, 2 2, 4
 
 
Before the game was started, the subjects were informed that the probability of 
getting card A and card C was exactly 50 per cent.  As you can see from the table, the 
actual proportions were close, but not perfect.  Card A was dealt 85 times out of a 
possible 190 (45 per cent) and card C was dealt 105 times (55 per cent).   
By looking at the right side of the table where player one received card A, we see 
that player one folded once.  In principle, one should never fold with card A. Because this 
action was chosen in the fifth round of a total of ten rounds, the most reasonable 
explanation is that player 1 either inadvertently chose to fold, or that they incorrectly 
thought they were dealt card C.  In a real poker match, it might seem reasonable to fold 
when you have a good hand in order to confuse other players, but it is doubtful that this 
accurately describes this player’s strategy.  Now take look at the right side of the table 
where card C was dealt.  Player 1 bet an overwhelming 64 per cent of the time while 
folding 36 per cent of the time.  What does this suggest about the aggregate player’s 
strategy over time? 
Looking at player 1’s decisions when they received card A reveals no information 
regarding their strategy unless they folded.  This is true because both mixed-strategies 
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involve betting with card A.  However, let’s assume the one fold with card A was 
inadvertent.  That being said, we can estimate player 1’s probability of mixing his/or her 
strategy by looking at their decisions when given card C.5
As mentioned above, player 1 bet 64 per cent of the time given card C.  More 
intuitively, player 1 played the bluffing strategy 64 per cent of the time and played the 
truth-telling strategy 36 per cent of the time, on average.   
Let’s look at player 2’s strategy when under both states of the world.  Because 
player 2 doesn’t know which card player one has been given, in terms of strategy, 
nothing is gained by looking at player 2’s decision individually in each state.  Therefore 
we must add up the number of times player 2 folded (120) regardless of the state, and 
divide that number by the total amount of times player 1 bet (151).  On average, player 
two called 79.5 per cent and folded 20.5 per cent.  Table 4 below compares the mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium with the laboratory data for the base treatment.   
Table 4. Theory vs. Results for the base treatment 
 Player 1 Player 2 
Theory Bluff 33%, Truth-tell 67% Call 67%, Fold 33% 
Results Bluff 64%, Truth-tell 36% Call 79.5%, Fold 20.5% 
 
 
Player 1 bluffed 31 per cent more than the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and 
player 2 called 12.5 per cent more than the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.  Moreover, 
neither player was unilaterally playing their best response given what the other player 
was doing.  Figure 4 below shows both players’ best response functions: 
 
                                                 
5 The probability estimates follow a binomial distribution.  Further statistical analyses, including 




Figure 4. Best response functions for the base treatment. 
 
If q (the probability that player 2 plays call) > 2/3, then player one’s expected 
payoff to truth-tell exceeds his expected payoff to bluffing, and hence exceeds also his 
expected payoff to every mixed strategy that assigns a positive probability to bluffing.  
Similarly, if q < 2/3, then player 1’s expected payoff to bluffing exceeds his expected 
payoff to truth-tell, and hence exceeds also his expected payoff to every mixed strategy 
that assigns a positive probability to truth-tell.  If q = 2/3, then both bluffing and truth-
tell, and hence all his mixed strategies, yield the same expected payoff.   
Likewise, if p (the probability that player 1 plays bluff) > 1/3, then player two’s 
expected payoff to call exceeds his expected payoff to fold, and hence exceeds also his 
expected payoff to every mixed strategy that assigns a positive probability to fold.  If p < 
1/3, then player two’s expected payoff to fold exceeds his expected payoff to call, and 
hence exceeds also his expected payoff to every mixed strategy that assigns a positive 
probability to call.  If p = 1/3, then both call and fold, and hence all his mixed strategies, 
yield the same expected payoff. 
 19
Given that player two called 79.5 per cent of the time, player one’s best response 
would have been to always truth-tell.  Likewise, given that player one bluffed 64 per cent 







Table 5.  Aggregate experiment results from treatment 1. 
Player 1 given… 
 
Card A 135/187 (72%)  Card C 52/187 (28%)  




 (67%)  
Fold 17/52 
(33%)  
Player 2 Call 90/134 (67%)  
Fold 44/134 




(46%)   
Payoffs 5, 1  4, 2  2, 4 1, 5  4, 2  2, 4  
 
Once again, before the game started, it was explained to the subjects that the 
probability of getting card A was now 74 per cent, and the probability of getting card C 
was 26 per cent6.  Player 1 received card A 72 per cent of the time and received card C 
28 per cent of the time.  Again, a single player folded once when given card A, but all 
others bet 134 times.  When given card C, player one bet 67 per cent of the time and 
folded 33 per cent of the time.  Player two called 64 per cent of the time and folded 36 
per cent of the time.  Table 7 compares the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to the results 
from treatment 1.  
 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that after making this announcement, the player 2s were very unhappy.  Given that 
player 1 earned 15 more points than player 2 on average over the ten rounds, they had every right to be 
upset! 
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Table 6.  Theory vs. results for treatment 1. 
 Player 1 Player 2 
Theory Bluff 95%, Truth-tell 5% Call 67%, Fold 33% 
Results Bluff 67%, Truth-tell 33% Call 64%, Fold 36% 
 
Player 1 bluffed 28 per cent less than the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium and player 2 
called just 3 per cent less than the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, though not the best 
response to player one’s actual strategy.  Given that player 1 bluffed less than the optimal 
amount, in this case 95 per cent, player 2’s best response was to always fold.  Similarly, 
given that player 2 called less than the optimal amount, player 1’s best response was to 
always bluff.  This can be observed by looking at figure 5 below: 
 
 





Player 1 bluffed only 25 per cent of the time.  This is what was intended.  In 
theory, they should have bluffed less, but there responsiveness was significant 
nonetheless.  Player 2 called 93 per cent of the time, markedly above the mixed-strategy 
Nash equilibrium.  Table 7 shows the decisions made in treatment 2 and Table 8 
compares theory with the data from treatment 2: 
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Table 7.   Aggregate experiment results from treatment 2. 
Player 1 given…  




 (100%)  
Fold 0/24 
(0%)  













(6%)   
Payoffs 5, 1  4, 2  2, 4  1, 5  4, 2  2, 4  
 
Table 8.  Theory vs. results for treatment 2. 
 Player 1 Player 2 
Theory Bluff 11%, Truth-tell 89% Call 67%, Fold 33% 
Results Bluff 25%, Truth-tell 75% Call 93%, Fold 7% 
Player one bluffed 14 per cent more than the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium and 
player two called 26 per cent more than the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.   
Given that player 1 was playing his strategy nearly 14 per cent over the mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium, player 2’s best response was to call 100 per cent of the time.  
Remarkably, player two called 93 per cent of the time. Figure 6 below shows each 
player’s best response functions for treatment 2: 
 




Table 9. Aggregate experiment results from treatment 3. 
Player 1 given… 
 
Card A 34/86 (40%)  Card C 52/86 (60%)  
Player 1 Bet 31/34  (91%)  
Fold 3/34 
(9%)  




Player 2 Call 25/31 (81%)  
Fold 6/31 




(33%)   
Payoffs 5, 1  4, 3.5  2, 4  1, 10  4, 2  2, 4  
 
 
Table 10. Theory vs. results for treatment 3. 
 Player 1 Player 2 
Theory Bluff 12.5%, Truth-tell 87.5% Call 17%, Fold 83% 
Results Bluff 17%, Truth-tell 83% Call 77%, Fold 23% 
 
 
Player 1 told the truth 83 per cent of the time.  This is only 4.5 per cent less than the Nash 
prediction. Player 2 called 77 per cent of the time, 60 per cent more than the Nash 
prediction.   
 
 
Table 11.  Best response functions for treatment 3. 
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Given that player 1 was bluffing more than one-eighth of the time, player 2’s best 
response was to call 100 per cent of the time.  Likewise, given that player 2 was calling 




 The results from the base treatment show a major disconnect between actual 
behavior and Nash predictions.  Player 1 was not truth-telling enough and player 2 was 
calling too much.  
 After announcing that card A would be given 74 per cent of the time for treatment 
1, the player 1’s failed to respond by bluffing more often but the player 2’s responded 
correctly by calling less than they were in the base treatment.  Furthermore, player 2’s  
actions followed closely to the Nash predictions, though they were not the best response 
to player 1’s actual strategy.   
 Both truth-telling and calling increased significantly during treatment 2.  The 
increase in truth-telling was predicted, however the increase in calling was unexpected.   
 Truth-telling increased significantly when the costs of bluffing were increased.  
Furthermore, the rate of truth-telling was extremely close to the Nash predictions. 
However, the rate of calling was much higher than the Nash predictions.  These findings 




 In this paper I have shown that college age students behave strategically when 
confronted with decisions in which they could rationally deceive one another. The 
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laboratory results suggest that there are indeed robust inconsistencies between theoretical 
predictions and revealed human behavior.  These conclusions support prior reports given 
by others within the field of economics.  Goeree and Holt (2001) suggest that observed 
behavior from laboratory experiments in which conform to the Nash mixed-strategy 
prediction seem “to only work by coincidence, when the payoffs are symmetric.”   
On the other hand, there were cases where changes in the treatment produced 
behavior that conformed rather nicely to theoretical predictions.  When the opportunity 
cost of bluffing increased, the students’ propensity to tell the truth markedly increased. 
To the extent that children behave in accordance with adults, these findings are 
non-trivial.  Unlike previous results from psychology studies, these results come from an 
experiment with both real payoffs and real consequences. The results imply that the 
propensity to tell the truth is a function of the costs and rewards of doing so and in 
particular of the costs of being detected.  That being said, possible methods designed to 
help facilitate lowering these costs or sufficiently increasing the rewards could bring the 
truth out of children and increase the legitimacy of adolescent testimony.  These findings 
ought to be very useful to justice officials, prosecutors, and researchers. 
In the future I plan on extending this experiment to kids old enough to understand 
the game.  My current findings coupled with possible data on kids helps strengthen the 
pre-existing literature on lie- and truth-telling and adds compelling evidence that helps 
explain some of the factors that change the propensity of truth-telling.  
There are of course shortcomings of this research.  One could argue that a poker 
match isn’t the most appropriate way of modeling the elements of truth-telling and to an 
extent those critics are correct.  Maybe there are better ways to model and observe this 
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kind of behavior such as developing some sort of mock court where the rate of detection 
and penalties vary. However, this proposal seems a bit too contrived to be considered as a 
viable method of studying deception.   
The games played were just that, games.  Though there are truths in such 
arguments, the results reported in this paper do not lie.  If you find yourself skeptical of 
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Table A.1. Binomial Distribution Properties 
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Table A2.  Confidence Intervals for estimated parameters 
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Figure A1.  A screenshot of the experiment taken from player 1’s perspective. 
 
Notice the bluff : ) 
 
Figure A2. A screenshot of the experiment taken from player 2’s perspective. 
 
…and the call of the bluff 
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Figure A3. Payout history from player 2’s perspective. 
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